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In the subsequent case of Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa.
500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955), (reversed on other grounds), the deceased, a partner in crime of the defendant, set the fire which
caused his death. The felony-murder rule was held applicable.
The case is distinguishable from the principal case however, in
that the defendant in this case satisfied at least the minimum act
required to impute the death directly to him, since he instigated
the felony and induced the deceased to commit the highly life
endangering crime of arson. Moreover, no third person's act was
responsible directly for the death. Thus, neither as to actus reus,
nor as to mens rea, does Commonwealth v. Bolish, supra, present
as dangerous a departure from common law standards as does the
instant case.
With the mentioned precedents at its command it was not
difficult for the Pennsylvania court to render the instant decision.
This case seemingly would fall within the unfortunate Pennsylvania felony-murder rule, but for one aspect: the killing in the
perpetration of the felony must be murder. How could the court
ignore the words of the legislature? Penal statutes must be strictly
construed. In construing the word murder to mean any loss of
life, the court has violated one of the basic canons of statutory
construction. See Stull v. Reber, 215 Pa. 156, 64 Atl. 419 (1906).
One of the underlying reasons that prompted the majority of
the court to decide in favor of applying the felony-murder in this
case was "the protection of society". Commonwealth v. Thomas,
supra at 207. The whole history of the penal law suggests that
the court took a step in the wrong direction. Extreme punishments, and imposition of liability without fault-even partial liability without fault-weaken rather than strengthen respect for the
law.
G. T. L.

DuE Pmon To 1921-SxLE NOT
STATUTE OF LIMIrATIoNs.-A executed a note to B, due
and payable on November 1, 1914, and conveyed Blackacre-to T,
trustee, to secure payment. B died, leaving P as distributee and heir
at law. C purchased Blackacre from A, and C and wife executed a
note to P, due November 1, 1925, allegedly including the above debt.
C died, leaving a widow and D, children and heirs at law. The
widow died in 1952, and thereafter P requested T to sell Blackacre,
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but T refused. P filed a bill praying for the removal of T and the
appointment of another trustee. From a decree favorable to F, D
appealed, assigning as error, inter alia, that sale under the deed of
trust was barred by the statute of limitations, that a presumption
of payment should have been applied, and that P's claim was barred
by laches. Held, affirming judgment, that it would be unconstitutional to apply the statute of limitations retroactively, that the
evidence rebutted the presumption of payment, and that the circumstances excused the delay on the part of P. Kuhn v. Shreeve, 89
S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1955).
For the third time since the enactment of the statute in 1921,
the West Virginia court has held that the statute of limitations
cannot constitutionally be applied to a sale under a deed of trust
when the obligation secured thereby became due prior to the date
of the statute. W. VA. CODE c. 104, § 5a (Barnes 1923) provided
that "No lien. . . created by any deed of trust . .. shall be valid
or binding as a lien... after the expiration of 20 years from which
the debt or obligation secured thereby becomes due ...." This limitation was re-enacted in substance, and enlarged to include a
lien reserved on the face of any conveyance of real estate, in W. VA.
Bnv. CoDE c. 55, art. 2, § 5 (1931). In LeSage v. Switzer, 116 W.
Va. 657, 182 S.E. 797 (1935), the court held that any retroactive
application would be an impairment of the obligation of contract,
and therefore unconstitutional under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, and
W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 4. It is possible that the statute could have
been interpreted as barring such liens after twenty years from its
passage, i.e., 1941, but this construction was impliedly rejected in
McClintic v. Dunbar Land Co., 127 W. Va. 454, 33 S.E.2d 593
(1945). There, the court allowed a sale, although the obligation was
due in 1919, and suit to enforce the debt was not begun until 1943.
The record does not show whether the above interpretation was
mentioned to the court, but if it were, it was not accepted. The
statute in question was amended in 1949, W. Va. Acts, c. 1, but the
provision mentioned was not materially changed, and the opinion
in the instant case said that there was no substantial difference as
to the barring of the lien. The opinion in the principal case seemed
to be inaccurate in saying that ". .. the ...note here asserted is not
barred by the statute ... ." supra at 691 (emphasis added). On a
contract in writing, signed by the party to be charged or his agent,
action must be brought within ten years from the date when the
right of action accrues. W. VA. CoDE c. 55, art. 2, § 6 (Michie 1955).
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This would clearly bar any action on the notes, 40 and 29 years past
due, but it is well settled law in West Virginia and elsewhere that
although a note may be barred, a mortgage foreclosure or a sale
under a deed of trust securing the note is not barred short of a
period which would raise a presumption of payment. LeSage v.
Switzer, supra; Criss v. Criss, 28 W. Va. 388 (1886); Camden v.
Alkire, 24 W. Va. 674 (1884). After a statute of limitations has
run against a debt, a creditor remains entitled to use any lawful
means available for collecting his debt which does not involve court
action. Morgan v. Farmington Coal & Coke Co., 97 W. Va. 83, 124
S.E. 591 (1924); Roots v. Mason City S. & M. Co., 27 W. Va. 488
(1886); 6 WmliSTON, Colraacrs § 2002 (rev. ed. 1938). Sale under
a deed of trust requires no assistance from the courts. LeSage v.
Switzer, supra at 659.
Since it is apparently settled that the statute of limitations
cannot be applied to deeds of trust securing pre-1921 obligations,
the main protection against such encumbrances is the presumption
of payment, mentioned above. After the passage of a certain time,
the debt is presumed paid, but such presumption can be rebutted
by sufficient evidence. Payne v. Dudley, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 476
(1793). The presumption applies whether the debt is secured by
a deed of trust or not. Criss v. Criss, supra. The period sufficient
to establish the presumption in the Virginias is twenty years. Payne
v. Dudley, supra;Pitzer v. Burns, 7 W. Va. 63 (1873). It has been
stated that the presumption may be repelled by evidence of the
relations and circumstances of the parties. Camden v. Alkire, supra
at 678. The principal case said that the presumption was factual,
and could be rebutted. However clear this abstract rule may be,
the application of the rule is not so clear, as to what will or what
will not rebut the presumption. The instant opinion stated that
possession of a note by the payee is prima facie evidence of ownership, and that " [N] o showing of payment is made in this record."
This language can be questioned on two grounds: (1) should the
"prima facie evidence" be sufficient to overcome the presumption
of payment, and (2) if payment is presumed, why is it necessary
to show payment in the record? When a creditor has not attempted
to enforce his rights for over twenty years, it would seem that any
rebuttal of the presumption should be strong and convincing. In
Criss v. Criss, supra, circumstances held insufficient to rebut the
presumption were the occurrence of the Civil War during the subsistence of the debt, as there was no evidence that either party was
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actively engaged, and the lack of any other obstacle to enforcing
payment. Further, the statement by the payee that "Not one dollar
of this debt has ever been paid" was insufficient to rebut, even
though he was a competent witness. The court indicated that the
presumption would be rebutted by proof of payment of interest
during the twenty year period, continued absence from the country
by the obligee, continued insolvency of the obligor, or other strong
circumstances showing nonpayment or good cause for longer forebearance. Supra at 403-04. The presumption may be rebutted by
payment of part of the principal of the debt, Camden v. Alkire,
supra, or by acknowledgement by the debtor, Payne v. Dudley,
supra. None of the above seemed to be present in the principal case.
However, the court apparently placed emphasis on the fact that the
obligees and the widow of the obligor were related, and that the
plaintiffs did not wish to create a hardship on her by forcing a sale
of her home. This circumstance was held to excuse the delay in
enforcing the debt, thereby precluding the defense of laches, but in
view of the strength of the presumption as stated in the Criss case,
supra, it is questionable whether this factor alone should be a sufficient rebuttal. Evidently, when the above relationship was considered in conjunction with the possession of the note by the obligees,
it was enough to rebut the presumption.
The case stands as a warning to the title examiner who finds an
unreleased deed of trust, when the obligation it secures became
due prior to 1921. The abstractor must evaluate the strength of
the presumption as applied to the facts of the particular case and
advise accordingly. An unreleased encumbrance is excepted from
the provisions of a title insurance policy, and the insured is not
protected against its enforcement. GAGE, LAND TrrLE AssURING
AGENCIES 91 (1937). Therefore, it is important to determine what
weight the court is going to give to the presumption of payment,
if and when the question again arises.
C. M. C.
EvmENcE - PIvILEGE

AGAINST SxiF-INCIUMIATION - CONSTrTU-

was adjudged guilty of contempt of court for refusing to testify before a grand jury investigating matters concerned with attempts to endanger the national
security. D had been ordered by a federal district court, under
the authority granted by the Immunity Act of 1954, to testify with
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